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ANGLO-SP ANISH RELATIONS AND THE RECOGNITION 
OF SPANISH AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE • 
When the revolutions which eventually culminated in the 
independence of Spanish America broke out in 181 O, Britain 
adopted a policy of neutrality between Spain and her colonies. She 
interpreted this as obliging her to refrain from recognising the 
regimes set up in South America and from establishing official 
relations with them, as long as the outcome of the conflict was 
uncertain. Although the Liberal Revolution of 1820 put an end 
to any hopes of Spanish reconquest of the colonies (at least in 
the opinion of British observers), the new constitutional regime 
appeared prepared to negotiate with the insurgents; and it would 
not have been appropriate for Britain to make any move towards 
recognition, while attempts at a settlement were in progress. How­
ever, by 1822 all of the mainland colonies, except for sorne parts 
of Peru and adjacent territories to north and south, had clearly 
achieved their independence, and the United States had decided 
on recognition. It then appeared that, unless Britain followed 
suit, her already extensive commercial interests in Spanish America 
would be threatened by exclusive arrangements between the new 
states and the U.S.A. 
Britain therefore responded in }une 1822 by taking hér first 
important step towards recognition - the admission to _Brit�h 
ports of ships under insurgent flags. Although Spain was relieved 
that this measure was purefy comm�rcial, and did not involve 
política! recognition, Britain also made it clear that she would 
not commit herself to waiting indefinitely far the mother country 
to reach an agreement with the colonies, and that if Spain could 
• The research f or this article was made possible by financia! grants from
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not restare her control over Spanish America's international re­
lations, these relations would, sooner or later, have to be esta­
blished directly. This warning was repeated and notified to the 
other European powers at the Congress of Verona in November 
1822. However, the Congress showed more interest in denouncing 
the Spanish government and threatening a French invasion of 
the P.eninsula. As Britain did not wish to appear to be associated 
in any way with reactionary coercion of the Spanish constitutional 
regime, further action on Spanish America was delayed, while 
Britain attempted to influence the Spanish government to make the 
constitutional reforms demanded by the Congress powers. She 
hoped in this way to avert the French intervention, wich she 
knew she could not prevent by military means; but the effort 
was unavailing, and France invaded Spain in the spring of 1823. 1 
This was a serious diplomatic setback for Britain, for, as the 
French armies proceeded across the Península, Anglo-Spanish re­
lations diminished (and even ceased to exist far a while, when 
the embattled liberals placed King Ferdinand VII under duress, 
and the British Ambassador withdrew to Gibraltar); and when in 
October 1823 the King was restored to absolute power by French 
military success, it was natural for him to establish close relations 
with his liberators. Britain, it appeared, had lost the power to 
influence Spain far the foreseeable future, and now, whatever her 
preferences may have been, had perforce to concentrate her 
attention on Spanish America. As the Prime Minister, Lord Liver­
pool, put it at the time: « ... 1 amas glad as any one that we have 
left the Spaniards and French to themselves, but we must not 
overlook the circumstance that the influence of France in Spain 
is far the present triumphant, greater perhaps than ours ever 
was at any period of the late war. Be it so - we can not help it.
But let us at least take care of our interests in other quarters, 
1 For a more detailed account of these developments see Waddell, D. A. G.: 
Anolo-Spanish relations and the 'Pacification of America' durino the 'Constitutional 
Triennium·. 1820-1823, «Anuario de Estudios Americanos», tomo XLVI, Sevilla, 
1989, págs. 455-486. 
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and more particularly of those interests which are connected with 
our commerce and maritime power». 2
The British Foreign Minister, George Canning, had already 
begun to look to the preservation of British interests across the 
Atlantic. In a dispatch sent to París on the eve of the French 
invasion, he invited France to match Britain's disavowal of any 
territorial designs on Spanish America, as the only source of 
possible Anglo-French conflict that might arise from the Franco­
Spanish war. 3 No such disavowal was forthcoming, however, and, 
in face of rumours that France planned to follow up her succci>s 
in Spain by assisting in the recovery of Spanish control over the 
colonies, 4 he sounded the United States on the possibility of a 
joint declaration to the effect that they believed the recovery of 
the colonies by Spain to be hopeless, and that they would object' 
to the transf er of any of them to any other power. The Americans, 
however, having already recognised sorne of the new states, were 
not prepared to cooperate with Britain unless she also recognised 
them. They eventually went their own way, and in December 1823 
President Monroe made the unilateral statement of opposition 
to European interference of new colonisation in the western he­
misphere that carne to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. 
Meanwhile, Canning had turned back to France; and in a con­
ference with the French Ambassador, Prince Polignac, eariy in 
October 1823, he obtained the French disvowal of any intention 
to act against the Spanish colonies by force of arms, which he had 
been seeking for the previous six months. 5
2 British Library, Manuscripts Division. London (B. L.). Loan 57, (,.Bathurst 
MSS), vol. 14, núm. 1726. Liverpool to Bathurst. Private, 16 October 1823. 
3 Canning to Stuart. 31 March 1823, printed in Webster, C. K. (e<t): 
Britain and the Indepenclence o/ Lafüi America, 1812-1830. 2 vols. London, 1938, 
vol. II, págs. 111-112. 
4 Stuart to Canning. 23 June, 22 S�ptember 1823, printed in Webster, 
Britain and Independence ... , U, págs. 112-113; Canning to Wellington. 25 September 
1823, printed in Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda o/ the Duke of 
Wellington (ed. Wellington, 8 vols. London, 1867-1830), vol. II, págs. 139-140. For 
divergent views on whether there actually were such intentions, see Temperley, H.: 
French designs on Spanish America. 1820-182'6, «English Histarical Review:., 
vol. XL, 1925, págs. 34-53, and Robertson, W. S.: France and Latin American 
Independence. Baltimore. 1939, págs. 253-�95. 
5 Kaufmann, W. W.: British Policy and the lndependence of Latin America, 
1804-1828. New Haven, 1951, págs. 150-163. 
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Simultaneously, on 10 October 1823, Canning took a majar 
step towards recognition by naming commissioners and consuls 
to go to Spanish America. The decision to send commercial agents 
had been taken almost a year earlier, but its implementation had 
been deferred. 6 In July and August 1823 various groups of me� 
chants from different parts of the country were urging the appoint­
ment of consuls, 7 though it is difficult to say how much 
influeilce this may have had on the Foreign Minister's activities 
over the next few weeks in finding suitable nominees for the 
various posts and preparing their instructions. 8 But Canning's 
action went beyond the simple sending out of commercial agents. 
The idea of broadening the scope of the missions to Spanish Ame­
rica to include political matters may have originated in June, 
when Liverpool, alarmed by news that the republican government 
in Mexico was seeking sorne connection with the United States, 
suggested to Canning that sorne reliable emissary should be sent 
to indicate Britain's readiness to recognise Mexico on certain con­
ditions. 9 It could well have been in response to this that Canning 
in Juiy started to draw up instructions for a special commission 
6 Canning later claimed that this was a considerate gesture towards Spain 
(see Polignac Memorandum. October 1823, and Canning to A'Court, 30 January 
1824, printed in Webster, Btitain and lndependence ...• II, págs. 116, 414). 
7 Public Record Office, London (P. R. O.), FO 72/283, fols. 24-55. 
8 This was a troublesome task, as he told one of his Cabinet colleagues. 
B. L., Loan 57, vol. 14, núm. 1.716. Canning to Bathurst. 9 October 1823. He
had to consult the King•s wishes -- he asked the King on 23 August if he had
any names to suggest (West Yorkshire Archives, Leeds (W. Y. A.). Canning
MSS 100), and to consider the claims of patronage - most of the appointees are
to be found in the list of applicants for consulships and their patrons, drawn
up apparently soon after Canning took office in 1822 (printed in Jones, Ri. A.:
An early nineteenth-century patronaoe list: Georoe Canninu and the consular
service, 1822. «Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research�, vol. LVI, núm. 134,
1983, págs. ,232-238). For details of the appointees and their posts, see Humphreys,
R. A. (ed.): British Consular Reports on the Trade and Politics of ILatin America�
1824-1826. Camden Third Series, vol. LXIII, London, 1940, págs. xviii-xix.
9 W. Y. A., Canning MSS, 70. Liverpool to Canning. Secret, 9 June 1823', 
Canning had already sent a secret agent, Dr. Patrick Mackie, a personal acquain­
tance of its ruler, Iturbide, to Mexico in December 1822. It was evidently intencfed 
that Mackie should only gather information, though this did not prevent him from 
entering into unauthorised dealings with Iturbide's successors (see Webster, Britain 
and Independence ... , II, págs. 431-434, 438-442, 450-452), Liverpool's proposal appears 
to have been for a rather more formal mission than Mackie's. 
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to Mexico. 10 The comm1ss1oners were to report on whether the 
country had established its independence, and if so, whether it was 
determined to and capable of n1aintaining it, and whether its 
government enjoyed the confidence of the people. If these condi­
tions were met, the commissioners could invite the government 
to send a representative to London, to discuss the possibility of 
establishing diplomatic relations. 
Rumours of the appointment of the Mexican commission 
leaked out, and were published in the press in mid-August, much 
to Canning's annoyance. 11 For Mexico was not the only cause 
for concern and candidate for recognition: similar commissions 
were being prepared f or Colombia and Buenos Aires ( though in 
the latter case it was finally left to the consul-general to act as 
commissioner as well). 12 Canning presumably wished to be in a 
position to announce all the appointments of both consuls and 
commissioners at the same time ( they were all dated 1 O October), 
so as to emphasise that a major diplomatic step was being taken; 
and it is probably no coincidence that the announcement was timed 
so that it could act as a riposte to the news of the final surrender 
of the Spanish constitutionalists, and the complete triumph of 
the French in the Península. 13 The missions appointed in Octobcr 
1823 clearly foreshadowed political recognition. But the procedure 
10 For dating of the instructions, which were finally issued on 10 October, 
see Webster, Britain and Independence ... , II. pág. 433. The original draft, as 
discussed in Cabinet and criticised by Wellington, apparently made a considerable 
commitment towards British recognition, and included sorne reference to the 
dangers of French control or United States' influence as possible grounds for 
such action while the final version placed more emphasis on enquiring_ into the 
actual state of Mexico. The Journal of Mrs. Arbuthnot, 1820-1832. Ed. Bamford 
and Wellington, 2 vols. London, 1950, vol. I, pág. 248 (entry for 1 August 1&23):
Wellington to Canning. :n July 1823, and enclosed memorandum, . printed in 
Despatches ... o/ Wellington, II, págs. 108-110).
11 W. Y. A., Canning MSS 151. Canning to Liverpool. 16 August 1823. 
12 Regarding alarm about possible French intentions in Colombia and condi­
tions there, see Lowe to Canning. 3 July 1823. W. Y. A., Canning MSS 132:
Dcspatches ... of Wellington, II, págs. 116-126. Regarding the mission to Buenos 
Aires, see Shuttleworth, N. ·L. K.: A Life of Sir Woodbine Parish. London, 1910, 
pág. 252. The instructions are printed in Webster, Britain and lndependence ... , I, 
págs. 433-436, 351-35i.
13 As suggested by, for example, Rolo, P. J. V.: George Canning: three 
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adopted meant that any definite decision would have to wait 
severa! months - until the commissioners had reached their des­
tinations and made their investigations, and their reports had 
been received in London. 14 
The increased attention given by Britain to her direct rela­
tions with Spanish America was balanced by the virtual absence 
of discussion on the subject with the restored absolutist govern­
ment in Spain. The despatches of the British minister in Madrid, 
Sir William A'Court, recorded much talk of grandiose schemes 
for the restoration of Spanish rule in the colonies by means of a
commercial company, or through allied arms or mediation, but 
no direct approach to him; although he did report that those 
concerned in such plans recognised that British acquiescence would 
be essential to their success. Canning meanwhile contented himself 
with keeping A'Court informed about developments, by sending 
him copies of the Polignac Memorandum and the instructions 
to the commissioners to Spanish America. Eventually on 2 De­
cember, A'Court reported that the Secretary of State had told him 
that Spain was anxious to come to an understanding with Britain 
over the colonies. His government had realised that no arrangd­
ment with any other powers would be of much value without 
British involvement, and it was, therefore, proposing to convene 
an international conference on the question. A'Court had replied 
that he had nothing to add to the Polignac Memorandum, which 
embodied Britain's views on the matter; and at the end of the 
month he duly forwarded the invitation to the conference to 
London. This took the form of a circular to France, Austria, 
Russia, Prussia and Britain. lt stated that the King of Spain, resto­
red to his throne after three years of civil war, was distressed to 
find that the insurrection in Spanish America had spread, but con-
14 The caution implied by this delay contrasts with Canning' s apparent 
willingness to recommend immediate recognition in November -18,22 (see Waddell, 
Anglo-Spanish relations .. . , págs. 481-483). But the decision not to proceed then, 
together with Wellington's reservations over the instructions in July 1823 (see 
núm. 10 above), may have convinced Canning that the Cabinet would not approve 
recognition without so lid evidence based on reliable reports from off icial �itish 
observers. 
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soled by the thought that most of his subjects remained loyal. He 
looked to his allies for support in upholding order and legitimac'y, 
and invited them to a conference in París, to discuss how the· 
rights and interest of the Spanish crown might be reconciled with 
those of other nations, in the light of the altered state of affairs 
in the colonies. 15
The idea of a conf eren ce of the European powers on Spanish 
America seems to have originated with the French, who, by the 
end of their campaign in Spain itself, had abandoned any thought 
of assisting in the reconquest of the colonies. Rather they wished 
for commercial reasons to establish relations with the new states, 
but were inhibited from doing so by their commitment to legiti­
macy and clase amity with the King Ferdinand VII. Accordingly 
they wished to bring the combined pressure of the powers on the 
Spanish King, to persuade him to negotiate with the colonists, 
and felt that this could best be done in a European congress. 16
Canning had already decided on his attitude towards the con­
ference. The matter had been · raised in his discussion with Po­
lignac, who had failed to persuade him to commit himself to 
participate. Indeed Canning had said that because of Britain's 
special interests in Spanish America, she could not enter a con­
ference on the same footing as other powers; and he added that 
did not see how the United States, with its clase interest in the 
area, could be left out of any discussions - a suggestion which 
he knew would be unacceptable to the reactionary monarchs. 17
15 P. R. O., FO 72/723. A'Court to Canning. Núms. 137, 138, 142, \45. 141, 
150, 166 dated 8, 19, 23, 27 November, 2, ao December 18¿.�l (parts of núm. 138-. 
núm. 142, núm. 147 printed in Webster: Britain and Independence ... , II, págs. �IOS-
410); P. R. O., FO 7�¡268. Canning to A'Court. Núm. 64, 13 October 1823. 
16 Kaufmann, British Policy ... , págs. 157, 167-170; Temperley, · H.: The 
Foreign Policy of Canninn. 1822-1827. 2nd. edn. London, 1966, págs. 132-137; Ro­
bertson, France ... , págs. 275-277, 280-288, 296-304. A congress would have had the 
additional advantage from the point of view of the continental powers, of giving 
them an opportunity to flatter and cajole Canning into f alling into line with 
their reactionary policies, in the way they had done with his predecessor, Castle� 
reagh. Tempcrley, H. W. V.: Canninn, Wellinoton. and Georne the Fourth. «English 
Historical Review», vol. XXXVIII, 1923, págs. 215-a6. 
17 Webster, Britain and lndependence ... , II, págs. 117-119. Before he had 
even received the formal invitation he had told A'Court, in a prívate letter, tha:t 
there would be no congress on Spanish America, and that President Monroe's 
1'omo XLV l/1 
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Canning replied to Spain's invitation to the conference on 
30 J anuary 1824 with a brutally frank statement of Britain's posi­
tion. He pointed out that Britain had always been prepared to 
media te to put an end to the dispute; but that there was now no 
hope of successful mediation except on the basis of independence. 
Britain's trade with the territories that had effectively separated 
themselves from Spain had grown to the point where consular 
agents had had to be sent out. Further steps towards diplomatic re­
cognition would be taken as and when necessary, in the light 
of reports received. Recognition could not be delayed much longer, 
but Britain would much prefer it if Spain were to act first. Shei 
would still be prepared to assist in the negotiation of a settlement, 
which could include preferential terms far the mother country 
in her trade with her ex-colonies. However, if Spain did not 
take appropriate action, Britain would feel free to take her own 
course, after giving Spain advance notice of her intentions. She 
saw no point in participating in a conference, as she had no inten� 
tion of changing the policy which she had already made clear to 
Spain and the other European powers - that she would re­
cognise when circumstances dictated, and would do so immedia­
tely if there was any attempt to exclude her from trade with South 
America, or if any other power gave armed assistance to Spain 
against the colonies. 18 
A'Court reported that Spain had opened up trade with South 
America, hoping that this would cause the British to reconsider 
their decision about the conference. The Spaniards did not believe 
that the recovery of the colonies was hopeless, and were relieved 
that British recognition was not to be immediate. But they had 
pronouncement had given it the coup de grace. Canning to A'Court. 31 December 
18.23, printed in Stapleton, A. G.: Georoe Cannino and his Times. London, 1859, 
págs. 394-396. 
18 Canning to A'Court. 30 January 1824, printed in Webster, Britain and 
Independence . .. , II, págs. 412-416. Canning's original draft was toned down on the 
suggestion of Wellington (see Despatches ... of Wellington, II, págs. 188-192; Journal 
of Mrs. Arbuthnot, 21 January 1824, I, págs. 282-283), but, even befare its discussion 
in Cabinet, Canning was sufficiently conf ident to assure his ambassador in Russia 
tha there was no question of Britain parlicipating. Canning to Bagot. 22 January 
18.24, printed in Bagot, G.: Georoe Canning and his Friends. 2 vols. London, 1909, 
vol. II, págs. 21-22. 
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ANGLO-SPANISH RELATIONS 9 
no plan for the colonies, and were playing for time, by delaying 
a response until they learned of the British reaction to the free 
trade decree, and until they had received the replies of the other 
powers to the invitation to the conference. 19 Evidence of Spain's 
temporising attitude, and an explanation for it, can he found in 
communications of the same date from the Secretary of State 
to his diplomatic representatives in London and París. These 
made clear that Spain was determined not to follow Britain's 
advice to recognise colonial independence. Not only was the King 
not prepared to abandon his legitimate rights, and the welfare 
of his subjects both in Spain and America, but he was convinced 
that most of the inhabitants wished to return to royalist 
rule, and that the territories in rebel hands were in a state of 
anarchy. The chargé in London was theref ore to ,vork to prevent 
British recognition, in conjunction with the French, Russian and 
Austrian ambassadors; and even if the British persisted in their 
refusal to attend, the conference would go ahead, despite the risk 
that it might provide Britain with an excuse to precipitate her 
recognition. 20 Thus it was not surprising that the formal reply
to Canning's note was held back until 23 March, and that when 
it carne it was evasive. 21 
Canning, however, was anxious far something more definite. The 
matter had already been raised in Parliament, and he had defended 
the government's position by making public extracts from the 
Polignac Memorandum, the Spanish invitation to the conference, 
and his reply. There was sorne disposition to give Spain time to 
respond, but it was obvious that there would be further pressute 
for action. 22 In late March he had also received a report from
19 P. R. O., �.,O 72/2�. A'Court to Canning, núms. 24, 27, 29, 41. 44, 52 
dated 10, 12, 17, 28 February, 6, 21 March ·18�4; núm. 29, 17 February printed in 
Webster, Britain and Independence ... , II, págs. 417-490 
20 Archivo General de Simancas (A.G.S.), Estado 8.185. Ofalia to Páez de 
la Cadena, and to Ambassador in Paris. 23 March 1824.
21 P. R. O., FO 72/285. Enclosed in A'Court to Canning, núm. 54. 27 
March 1824. 
22 Great Britain, Parliament: Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. New Series, 
vol. X, cols. 3-28, 53-76, 105-106, 157, 708-719, 752-755, 970-1.009; see also Journal 
óf Mrs. Arbul'Jmot, 3, 6, 12 February, 8, 17 March 18�4. I, págs. 283-286, 292-293. 
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the comm1ss1oners that Mexico met the conditions for recogni­
tion. 23 After discussion in Cabinet, it was agreed that Canning 
should ask A'Court to warn Spain formally that Mexican recogni­
tion was not far off, and to give her a final chance of negotiations 
through British mediation; and this was followed up with a secret 
offer of a British guarantee to defend Spain's continued posses­
sion of Cuba against externa! attack, if Spain recognised the inde­
pendence of the mainland colonies. 24 Spain, however, did not feel
that the guarantee of Cuba could compensate for the sacrifice of 
the rest of the empire, and replied on 30 April declining the 
British proposals, principally on the grounds that Britain was 
misinformed about the true state of affairs in the colonies. A'Court 
felt that Spain was acting very much under the influence of the 
ambassadors of the other powers, who had their own motives 
for opposing Britain's line, but added that if Spain really believed 
in the reports she was receiving from Spanish America, her attitude 
was not suprising. It only remained for A'Court to ensure that 
Spain fully understood that Britain was now free to act without 
further reference to Spain. 25
The conference proposal had played into Canning's hands. He 
had been a ble to ignore Spain f or three months af ter the Polignac 
Memorandum of October 1823. Spain had had to approach him 
23 Hervey to Canning, 18 January 1824, printed in Webster, Britain and ln­
dependence. ... I. págs. 442-445. Unf ortunately this was written very soon after the 
commissioner's arrival, and contained sorne details that seemed at variance with its 
conclusions. Neither Wellington nor Bathurst considered that it provided a defen­
sible basis for recognition. Wellington to Canning. � March 1824, printed in 
Despatches.... of Wellington. II, pág. 240-242; W. Y. A., Canning MSS 106, 
Bathurst to Canning, 29 March 1824; Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, 24, 26, 29, 31 March. 
I, págs. 294-297, but the imminent arrival of a Mexican representative meant that 
sorne decision had to be taken soon. 
�� W. Y. A.. Canning MSS 71. Liverpool to Canning, 24 March 1824; Well­
ington to Canning, 4 Apri'l 1824, printed in Despaches ... , of Wellington, II, págs. 246-
247; W. Y. A., Canning MSS 101. Canning to George IV. 2 April 18.24; Canning to 
A'Court, núms. 13, 14, 31 March, 2 April 1824, printed in Webster, Britain mul 
lndependence .... II, págs. 421-424. 
25 P. R. O., FO 72/286. A'Court to Canning, núms. 70, 78, 95, dated 24 April. 
3 May, 4 June 1824; P. R. O., FO ?z/284. Canning to A'Court, núm. 18, 17 
May 1824 (A'Court's, núm. 78 and Canning's, núm. 18 printed in Webster, Britain 
and lndependence ... , II, págs. 424-427). See also Canning to Bagot. 29 May 1824. 
printed in Bagot, Canning and his Friends, II, págs. 239-241. 
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( though the manner in which the invitation was couched suggests 
sorne reluctance on Ferdinand 's part), 26 and this had enabled him 
to give the impression, far the benefit of Parliament, the Cabinet, 
and the allied powers, that he had shown Spain every possible 
consideration, and given her every opportunity to reach a favou­
rable settlement in advance of further action b'y Britain. How 
genuine his efforts were may be doubted, especially over the 
Cuba guarantee, which he privately admitted, could have involved 
Britain in great difficulties if it had been accepted. 27 Moreover, 
opening the question to the influence of public opinion by laying 
papers befare Parliament could scarcely be regarded as considerate 
towards Spain. The Duke of Wellington pointed out that the 
Spaniard were well aware that the British government did not 
normally involve Parliament in this way, and would infer tha.t 
the ministry was prepared to yield to the popular pressure for 
recognition, and was insincere in its claims of impartiality. 28 But 
the unquestionable result of Spain's entirely predictable refusal 
of Britain's offers was the freeing of Britain from any international 
commitments on Spanish America; and, after the issue had been 
debated again in the Commons, following petitions in favour of 
immediate recognition fron1 commercial interests in London and 
Manches ter, the Prime Minister was able to close the session on 
24 June by assuring Parliament that the government was under 
no obligation to delay, but was only awaiting reports from its 
own commissioners. 29 
But though all external constraints had been removed, and 
Parliamentary support had been mobilised, there remained tnuch 
internal opposition to be overcome in the Cabinet, particularly 
26 Kaufmann: British Policy ... , pág. 169. 
27 Canning to Bagot. 29 May 1824, printed in Bagot. Canning and his Friends. 
II, págs. 239-z41. 
28 Wellington to Liverpool, 5 March 1824, printed in Despaches... of Well­
ington, II, págs. 228-289 (Liverpool disagreed, see his reply Ibídem, págs. 242-243). 
For a general account of these negotiations see Temperley, Cannino. págs. 137-140. 
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from Wellington. 30 Moreover, King George IV was strongly 
against recognition, and was involved in an intrigue with repre­
sentatives of the European powers and sorne of the more reactio­
nary of his own ministers to get rid of Canning. 31 At this point, 
Mexico was no longer under consideration for immediate recogni­
tion. In April Canning had inquired whether the Mexicans might 
be willing to try to obtain prior Spanish recognition through com­
mercial or financia! concessions, and time had to be allowed f or 
an answer. Then in May new doubts arase about the stability of 
the political situation there. 32 Peru, where the war was still going 
on, was also ruled out and there was insufficient information on 
Chile. Canning was thus concentrating on Colombia and Buenos 
Aires as candidates for recognition, but when the matter was 
considered in full Cabinet, sorne members felt that Colombia's 
stability might be adversely affected by its involvement in the war 
against Spain in Peru. Canning and his suporters decided not to 
press far a favourable decision on Colombia, and contented them­
selves with an agreement to negotiate a commercial treaty with 
Buenos Aires, which, when ratified, would constitute diplomatic 
recognition. 33
George IV very much regretted the Cabinet's decision, 
which he felt was unnecessary and premature, and likely to en-
30 Wellington to Canning, 12 June 1824, printed in Despaches ... of Wellington, 
II, págs. 277-278: Arbuthnot to Bathurst, 11 July 18.24, Historical Manuscripts Com­
mission: Matiuscripts of Earl Bathurst. London, 1923, pág. 571; Journai of Mrs. 
Arbuthnot. 19 July 1824. I, págs. 328-329. 
31 See Temperley: Canning, Wellington ... , págs. 218-219. 
3� See Canning to Hervey, núm. 3. 23 April 1824; Canning to Morier, núm. 4. 
30 July 1824; Canning to A'Court, núm. 18. 17 May 1824, printed in Webster, 
Britain and Independence.... I, págs. 446-450, 457-458; II, págs. 4.26-427: Journal 
of Mrs Arbuthnot. 10 Juna 1824, l. págs. 322<323. 
33 Cabinet Minute, 23 July 1824, printed in Stapleton: Canning ... , págs. 397-
400. A copy in W. Y. A., Canning MSS 131 lists those attending. See also Journal of
Mrs Arbuthnot. 25 July 1824, I. pág. 330. W. Y. A., Canning MSS 74. For a discus­
sion with another Cabinet colleague, see Harrowby to Canning, 5 July 1824:
Canning to Harrowby. 7 July 18�4. Harrowby pointed out that, thought it would be
difficulty o ver agreeing to Buenos Aires bef ore inf ormation had been received;
and equal dif f iculty over recognising Colombie first, and separately, as it was
the country in which British volunteers had been most involved. Canning was
able to assure him that a very satisfactory report had been received from
Buenos Aires.
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danger the peace of Europe because of the opposition of the con­
tinental powers. But he did not oppose it. 34 Wellington was also 
very unhappy with the decision, and tried to postpone its imple­
mentation bu'y suggesting that Canning should ascertain that the 
government of Buenos Aires had the authority to negotiate for 
the whole of the United Provinces of Río de la Plata, befare sending 
powers to make a treaty. Canning, who was already aware of the 
problem as a result of a visit of an emissary from Buenos Aires, 
considered that this would produce an unacceptable delay. Instead, 
when sending his envoy full powers on 23 August, he insisted 
that he should ensure that those he dealt with were empowered 
to act for the entire confederacy. Thcse instructions were received 
two months la ter, but it was a further two months befare the 
Buenos Aires government obtained the necessary authority, and 
not until J anuary 1825 that the commercial treaty was signed. 35 
Although the Cabinet decision of 23 July was the vital step 
in British recognition of Spanish An1erica, it had no immediate 
repercussions on Anglo-Spanish relations, because the Cabinet had 
decided that it should be kept secret for a time, and it was not 
communicated to Spain, the other powers or the public. 36 Indeed, 
there was sorne improvement in relations with Spain as a result 
of the brief mission of Francisco de Zea Bermúdez, who arrived 
as minister in London on 13 J uly ( taking over from the series of 
chargés who had done no more than keep the legation ticking 
over since the restoration of Ferdinand VII the previous October), 
only to learn a week later that he had been recalled to Madrid to 
become Secretary of State. 37 Zea found the diplomatic co.rps full 
� 
J4 rlie Letters of George IV, 1812-1830. Ed. A. Aspinall, 3 vols .. Cambridge, 
19J8, vol. IIt pág. 97, núm. 1.187. 
35 Metf ord, J. C. J.:. The recounition by Great Britain of the United Pro­
vinoes of Río de la Plata, «Bulletin of Hispanic Studies», vol. XXIX, 1952, págs. 217-
2.21; Ferns, H. S.: Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth century. Oxford, l&ftO, 
págs. 123-130; Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot. 9 August 1824. I, pág. 331; Despatches ...
of Wellington, II, págs. 297-298; P. R. O., FO 6/6 fols. 51-65, 71. Shutleworth, Life
of Parish, págs. 282-283. 
36 Canning to George IV, 1 February 18�5. printed in Stapleton, Canning,
pág. 425. 
. 37 For evidence of the limited activity of the London embassy, see Archivo 
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of rumours about the impending British recogn1t1on of sorne 
Spanish American state, but in his first interview with Canning 
on 17 July was told that there had been no developments since 
the discussions in Parliament in June. He complained that British 
policy showed little consideration towards Spain, and argued that 
total pacification of the colonies would not be difficult, if the 
British joined with the other allies in a combined effort to restare 
legitimacy. Canning agreed to discuss the matter further on another 
occasion, and at a meeting on 4 August he reiterated the British 
views that an allied conference would be futile; that each of the 
powers had to follow its own interest; and that Spain would do 
better to abandon any attempt at a general solution, and to make 
the best deal she could with each of the new states individually -
in which endeavour Britain's good offices would be available. 
In informing A' Court of what had transpired, Canning summed 
up Zea's view as amounting to the wish that Britain should take 
no account of the actual state of independence of any part of 
Spanish America, so long as there was any royalist resistance in 
an'y other part. 
Canning did not, however, reveal that a decision had already 
been taken over Buenos Aires; and when Zea reported home 
four days later he optimistically believed that his conversations 
with Canning and other members of the Cabinet, including 
Wellington, had undermined the resolution of the British ministers, 
and that the danger of recognition had passed for the moment -
a view, which he said, was shared by the allied ambassadors, 
through they may well have been influenced by the hopes Geor­
ge IV had been expressing to them that he would be able to gett: 
rid of Canning. 38 Befare Zea left in August to take up his new 
post in Madrid, Canning suggested that Liverpool should invite 
him to dinner, along with Frederick Lamb, the intended replace­
ment for A'Court, who was being transferred to Lisbon, as the 
38 A.G.S., Estado, 8.185. Zea to Ofalia, núm. 8, 19 July, to Salazar, núm. 33, 
8 August 18.24; P. R. O., FO 72/295, fols. 34-39. Memorandum of conference between 
Zea Bermúdez and Canning. 4 August 1824; Canning to A'Court, núm. 27. 7 August 
1824, printed in Webster: Britain and lndependence ... , II, págs. 427-429; Temperley: 
Canning, Wellington ... , págs. 218-219. 
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opportunity of «getting at a Spanish minister directly» should 
not be missed. It may well have been on this occasion that Zea 
was given to understand that Spain would be allowed a «limited 
interval» to make sorne arrangement with South America, the 
specific measure in mind being the attempt to place a Spanish 
prince on the throne of Mexico or Peru. 39
This Anglo-Spanish rapprochement, such as it was, did not 
outlast Zea's month-long stay. A successor was named, but Spain 
wished him to have ambassador rank. Canning refused to recipro­
cate, as he considered it inappropriate to maintain a senior diplo­
mat in a «kingdom occupied by a foreign force», and the appoint­
ment was cancelled. In September Canning wrote to Zea Bermú­
dez, in his new capacity as Spain's foreign minister, that, in view 
of the long period when Spain had tnaintained no minister in 
London, he would not send Lamb as minister to Madrid until 
the early arrival of an opposite number was assured. This left 
Britain with a problem over· representation there, as the only 
man on the spot, George Bosanquet, was very young and inexp�­
rienced. Far a time Canning appeared prepared to manage without 
an·y diplomatic representative, and, although after sorne hesitation 
he promoted Bosanquet to secretary of legation and chargé d'affai­
res, he clearly gave Anglo-Spanish relations a very low priority 
at this point. 40 
39 Canning to Liverpool, 30 July 1824, printed in Some Official Correspon­
dence of George Canning. Ed. E. J. Stapleton, 2 vols. London, 1887, vol. I, pág. 151: 
Lamb to Canning, núm. 5. 20 June 1825, printed in Webster: Britain and índepen➔ 
dence ... , II, pág. 443. This idea was also being discussed in París at same time. 
Stuart to Canning. 27 August 18.24, Ibídem, II, págs. 161-162. Canning had ea'flier 
shown sympathy for such a plan. A preference f or monarchical institutions had 
been expressed in the Polignac Memorandum. Webster, Britain and lndependen­
ce . .. , II, págs. 118-119, as a result of which Canning had accompanied the instructions 
of October 1823 to the commi�sioners to Mexico with a separate dispatch authorising 
them to welcome, but not to initiate, any proposal to place a Spanish Prince on 
the Mexican throne. W. Y. A., Canning MSS 70. Canning to Liverpool, 11 October 
1823 and Canning to Hervey, núm. 5 Secret. 10 October 1823, printed in Webster, 
Britain and lndependence ... , I, págs. 436-438. 
40 Canning to Granville. 17 August 1824, printed in O/ficial Corresvondence,
1, pág. 154; P. R. O., FO 72/295 fols. 44-48. Canning to Zea Bermúdez. 11 September 
1824; Planta to Bosanquet, 9 August; Canning to Bosanquet, núm. l. �5 October 1824, 
P.,. R. O., FO 72/288, fols. 1, 5; Canning to Liverpool, 17 October, 13 November 
1824, printed in Official Correspondence. I, pág. 179, 192-193. 
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There was more activity in other directions. Mexico was 
assuming sorne urgenc'y. The situation had stabilised, and its go­
vernment was responding, through a representative in London, to 
Canning's offer of April to media te with Spain. 41 Moreover, a 
favourable report had been received from the commissioners to 
Colombia. 42 But Canning and Liverpool were still concerned abmtt 
what might happen in Colombia, if Bolívar was defeated in Peru; 
this had been the reason for delay on Colombia in July, and still 
applied in November. If necessary, Canning argued in a secret 
memorandum for Liverpool, it could be publicly stated as a reason 
far delaying action on Colombia. 43 The pro-ministry newspaper, 
the «Courier», outlined this as the government's thinking on 
29 October, but, in forwarding a copy of the article to Madrid, 
the Spanish chargé argued that the arrival of news from Peru 
favourable to the royalist cause was the real rea son f or British 
holding back on recognition. However, a month later he passed 
on the view of one of his informants, that the government had 
now decided to recognise both Colombia and Mexico, and that 
general credence was being given in London to news that Bolívar 
had won a great victory in Peru. 44
41 P. R. O. FO 97/270. Memoranda of 22 September, 11 October 1824, latter 
printed in Webster, Britain and Independence ... , I, págs. 458-459; Rodríguez O., 
J. E.: The Emergence of Spanish America. Vicente Rocafuerte and Spanish Ame­
ricanism, 1808�1823. Berkeley, 1975, págs. 92-107; Canning to Liverpool, 17 October
1824, printed in Despatches ... of Wellington, II, pág. 324: Liverpool to Canning,
�4 October 1824, printed in Yonge, C. D.: The Life and Administration of the 2·nd
Earl of Liverpool. 3 vols. London, 1868, vol. III, págs. 296-297.
42 On 23 October 1824. Temperley, Cannino, pág. 145. But Canning was highly 
dissatisfied with its brevity, and insisted that the commissioner who had brought 
it should prepare a more cetai1led account. Webster, Britain and Independence ... ,
I, págs. 379-381, and P. R. O., FO 18/3. 
43 Liverpool to Canning, 24 October 18.24, printed in Yonge, The Lije ... ,
vol. III, págs. 296-297, Canning to Liverpool, 13 November 1824. Qfficial Correspon�
dence, I, págs. 192-193. B. L., Add. MS 38370, fols. 339-341. Most Secret and Confl­
dential. Mr Canning. South America &c. undated (later dated 1823 in another hand, 
but clearly October of November 1824 from interna! evidence). It was not until 10 De­
cember that Canning received his commissioner's final report, which contained the 
reassurance that he did not believe that a possible defeat of Bolívar could lead 
to a royalist reconquest of Colombia, or a pro-Spanish uprising there. P. R. O., 
FO 18/3, fols. 176-189. Enclosure to Campbell to Canning. 10 December 1824.
44 A. H. N., Estado, 5.475. Castillo to Zea, núm. 49. 1 November 1824; 
y 3 December 18�4. A.G.S., Estado, 8.186. 
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On the European side, the French had at last admitted in 
August, what Canning had known far sorne time, - that they 
had commercial agents stationed at various points in Spanish Ame­
rica. This, in Canning's view, vindicated arguments he had used 
in July, 45 about the need for Britain to anticípate the possible 
threat of French recognition. 46 More disturbing was news of 
French actions in the Península. Although Ferdinand VII's abso­
lutist regime had been restored for a ·year, the French had found 
that they could not withdraw all their troops without imperilling 
its stability. They therefore began to concentra te on holding 
Spanish fortresses, in what was beginning to look like a permanent 
military occupation. This was a violation of one of the understan­
dings on which Britain had based her neutrality when France in­
vaded in 1823, and threw continued doubt on the independence 
of Spain's international relations. In Nove1nber Canning circulated 
a memorandum embodying these points, 47 and after discussion in 
Cabinet on 1 and 2 December ,. it was agreed to ask France to set 
a definite date for complete withdrawal of its army from Spain. 48 
Meanwhile, Liverpool had related the issue of the French occupa­
tion to the Spanish American question in an important «Memoran­
dum on our relations with the Spanish American Provinces» dated 
30 November. 49 
This document noted that the first step towards the political 
recognition of Buenos Aires had already been taken, and that it 
was now necessary to make decisions regarding Mexico and Co­
lombia, with a view to reporting to Parliament when it reassernbled 
� 
45 W. Y. A., Canning MSS 101. Canning to George IV. 24 July 1824. 
W. Y. A., Canning MSS 74. Harrowby to Canning, 5 J�y 1824; Wellington to 
Canning, 26 July 1824, printed in Despatches .. . , of Wellingston, II, págs. �94�295.-
46 B. L., Add. MS 40311, fols. 73-74. Canning to Peel, 15 August 1824; He also 
thought it ought to quiet the· King's fears of continent al hostility towards further 
moves. 
47 W. Y. A .• Canning MSS 131. Memorandum on the proposed withdrawal 
of the French army from Spain. 
48 Journal o/ Mrs Arbuthnot. 4 December 1824, I, págs. 358-360. 
49 Printed in De spatches... of W ellinyton, II, págs. 354-358, and also in 
Yonge: LiDerpool, III, págs. 297-304, where it is stated that it was drawn up by 
Liverpool in bis own handwriting . Temperley, however, thinks Canning probably 
also had a hand in its composition. Tempe-rley, Canning, págs. 498-499. 
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in early February. It pointed out that recognition was an essential 
preliminary to establishing proper international relations, and so 
could not be long delayed by a country such as Britain, witH 
extensive interests in the new states. Indeed, these states could 
at any time force Britain to recognise, or risk losing all its trade 
to the United States, by the simple expedient of commercial dis­
crimination in favour of states that had recognised. lt then went 
on to argue that Britain ought not to delay her recognition on 
account of the reluctance of the majar European powers. The 
delay could not harm them as, unlike Britain, they had few if any 
real interests in the area; and their objections, which were based 
on the legitimate rights of Spain, could not be overcome until 
Spain herself recognised. There was no point in waiting for this, 
because she would not recognise as long as Britain hesitated, 
whereas British recognition might lead Spain to accept that the 
fate of the colonies was effectively decided. The memorandum fi­
nally turned to wider issues. In relation to France, it argued that 
the Family Compact between the Bourbon monarchs of France and 
Spain, which had been highly disadvantageous to Britain in the 
eighteenth century, had been broken by the Anglo-Spanish alliance 
during the Peninsular war, but had now been restored by the 
French occupation. Spain could no longer be regarder as a free 
agent in foreign policy, and in these circumstances it was impor­
tant for Britain that Spanish America should not be in the same 
state of dependence on France as the mother country. In relation 
to the United States, it suggested that the failure no recognise 
could result not only in serious commercial rivalry, but also in 
a consequential challenge to Britain's naval supremacy. And it 
concluded that the new states were at the moment favourably 
disposed towards Britain, and that it was important to take advan­
tage of the opportunity to consolidate Britain's position. 
The memorandum was discussed in Cabinet on 7 December, 
but its arguments were apparently not convincing enough, for all 
that was agreed was that the recognition of the Spanish American 
countries should be decided in the ligth of the situation of each 
state and of Britain's own interests, and that no further reference 
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need be made either to Spain or to the European powers. 50 On 
the same day Wellington wrote to Liverpool, expressing his objec­
tions to any further moves on Spanish America. In his view, 
Canning was the only minister interested in pressing the matter. 
If his dissent was inconvenient, he was quite to resign. The Prime 
Minister replied the following day saying that he very much 
wanted Wellington to remain in the Cabinet, but was himself con­
vinced of the necessity of recognition, especially because of the 
danger of an association between the new states and the U.S.A. 51
On 9 December Canning received the expected evasive answer 
from France on the duration of its occupation of Spain, 52 consulted
with Liverpool, 53 and then drew up a further paper. This empha­
sised that Britain should not appear to acquiesce in the continued 
French occupation of Spain, and that the most effective way of 
countering the increased power of France that it implied would be 
by separating the resources of Spanish America from Spain. Fortu­
nately this could be readily done by recognising Mexico and Co­
lombia, though there might be something to be said for delaying 
action on Colombia until there was more definite news from Peru. 
Mexico, however, was an obvious case, both because of the exten­
sive British interests there, and because of the desirability of pla ... 
cing a barrier in the way of the extension of the influence of the 
U.S.A. 54 
At the decisive meeting on 14 December, there was much 
opposition from the conservative element. But the threat of re­
signation from Liverpool and Canning brought about agreement 
50 Stapleton, Canning. págs. 405-406. 
51 Despatches ... of Wellinoton, II, págs. 364-366. See also Jou�al of Mrs. 
Arbuthnot, 6 December 1824, I, págs. 362-364. 
52 Temperley, Canning, pág. 146; Kaufmann, British Policy, pág. 177. The 
Cabinet found this unsatisfactory, and decided to consider the matter furlller. 
W. Y. A., Canning MSS 101. Canning to George IV. 9 December 18i4. See also 
Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, 10, 16 December 1824, I, págs. 364-366, who suggests 
that Canning knew that he could have obtained satisfactory assurances from the· 
French Ambassador, but deliberately chose a more provoca ti ve procedure. 
53 W. Y. A., Canning MSS 71. Canning to Liverpool. 11, 12, 14 December 
1824 (those of 11 and 14 printed in Ojficial Correspondence, I, págs. �12-213). ,. 
54 Printed in Temperley, Canning, págs. 550-554. 
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to recognise both Mexico and Colombia, though, as Canning later 
revealed, he and Liverpool would have been prepared to settle f or 
only Mexico. However, the French argument enabled them to 
carry Colon1bia as well. This was reflected in the Cabinet Minute, 
in which Canning reported the outcome to the King. It made 
only a brief reference to the growing influence of the United States 
in Mexico and Colombia, before fully rehearsing the need to react 
to the indefinite French military occupation of the Península, by 
means of preventing Spanish America from being brought under 
French influence, through the recognition of Mexico and Colom­
cia. 55 The King highly disapproved of a decision which he consi­
dered derogatory to the rights of monarchy, and offensive to his 
European allies, and he later showed his displeasure by refusing 
to open Parliament in person, so as to avoid announcing the 
hateful step in the King's Speech. But however great his reluc­
tance, he could not avoid the acceptance of his Cabinet's decision, 
as there was no real possibility of constructing a viable ministry 
without Canning and Liverpool. 56 
Canning's immediate comment on his achievement: «Spa­
nish America is free; and if we do not mismanage our affairs sadly, 
she is English ... » 57 epi tomises the significan ce of the s tep. I f 
the second part of the statement reflects a perhaps exaggerated 
55 Canning to Granville, 17 December 1824; Cabinet Minute, 14 December 
1824, printed in Stapleton, Canning, págs. 411-413, 407-411: Greville, C. C. F.: The 
Greville Memofrs. A Journal of the Reions of Kino Georae IV, King William Iv,· 
and Queen Victoria. Ed. H. Reeve. 8 vals. London, 1888, vol. I, págs. 107-108 (entry 
for 9 August 1827). See also Journdl of Mrs Arbuthnot, 18, 27, 29 December 1824, 
I, págs. 366-370. who gives Wellington's view that Canning sought an angry response 
from France as an excuse for recognising Spanish America, and had tricked 
the Cabinet into agreeing to that pollicy. Canning, however, thought that those m 
the Cabinet who tried to separa te the French question f rom that of Spanish 
America were being dishonest. W. Y. A., Canning MSS 71. Canning to Liverpool, 
14 December 1824. 
56 Stapleton: Canning, págs. 415-426; Despatches ... , of Wellington, 11, pá­
ginas 368-369, 373-374, 377-378, 385-386, 394-395, 401-404; Arbuthnot to Liverpool, 
29 December 1824, printed in Aspinall, A. (ed.): The Correspondence of Charles 
Arbuthnot. Camden Society, Third Serie. Vol. LXV, London, 1941, núm. 63, págs.7()..72; 
Temperley, Cannino, págs. 147, 151-152; Temperley, Canning, Wellington ... , págs. 219-
221; Hinde, Wendy: George Canning. London, 1973, págs. 367-370. 
57 Canning to Granville, 17 December 1824. Stapleton, Canning, págs. 411-413. 
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fear of the danger of United States rivalry, 58 the view in the first 
part, that recognition by the world's leading naval and commercial 
power set seal on independence, was endorsed by Latin American 
opinion. As a contemporary Colombian historian put it, the people 
were overjoyed, as they knew it meant the end of the war. 59 
Spain had not been considered at all in the final discussions 
over recognition. Indeed, since the departure of Zea in August, 
there had been no inter-governmental communications between 
Britain and Spain on Spanish America, and low level diplomatic 
representation in both capitals. In a sense this was not surprising, 
far une of the principal arguments for recognition in the final 
discussions was that Spain was not a free agent, and that her ex­
colonies should therefore be removed from potential French 
influence. Britain was, however, a free agent in the matter, as 
Canning had been at pains to ensure over the previous year, 
and it was of course this, and not her relationship with France, 
that Canning pointed out to Spain in the dispatch ( dated 31 De­
cember 1824) in which he ·announced the decision. This com­
munication, which Canning also read to the ambassadors of thc 
majar powers in London, called to mind that Britain had repeatedly 
explained that she would take further steps in the light of repotts 
of the situation in Spanish America and of British interests there. 
It had become clear that Mexico, Colombia and Buenos Ah·es 
had attained sufficient stability, and their commerce with Britain 
had developed to such an extent, for the negotiation of commcr­
cial treaties, ratification of which would constitute diplomatic 
recognition, to be appropriate. 60
58 For another expression of this, see Canning to Frere, 8 January 1825, 
prin!ed in Festing, G.: John Hookham Frere and his friends. London, 1899, pá­
ginas 267-¿.68; and f or a discussion, see Humphreys, R. A.: Angla-American rivalrie.i;; 
and Spanish American emancipation. «Transactions of the Royal Historical So-
ciety», Fifth Series, vol. XVI, 1966, págs. 150-156. 
59 Restrepo, J. M. : Historia de la Revolución en la República de Colcnnbia 
en la América meridional. 8 vols. Bogotá, 19'l2-1950. Vol. VI, pág. 337. See also the 
report of a British observer when the news reached Bogotá, that the people were 
rushing about the streels shouting: «We are now an independent nation!». Hamilton 
to Planta. 8 March 1825, printed in Webster, Britain and lndep:endence ... , I, pág. 385.
60 Canning to Bosanquet, núm. 7, 31 December 1824, printed in Webster, 
Britain and Independence ... , II, págs. 429-431; W. Y. A., Canning MSS 102. Canning 
,-to George IV, 1 January 1825. 
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Bosanquet read this dispatch to Zea Bermúdez on 1 O J anuary 
1825. The Spanish Secretary of State reacted with shock and 
horror, professing to be quite unprepared for such an announ­
cement. He said that Britain was completely misinformed about 
the true situation in Spanish America, and that, by encouraging 
rebellion, she was undermining the basis of all European govern­
ments. The British chargé believed that both Zea and the ministers 
of the other powers in Madrid, with whom he immediately 
consulted, had been taken completely by surprise by the British 
action. Zea replied with a note of 21 J anuary, in which Bosanquet 
detected the influence of the Russian and other allied emissaries. 
This started by bemoaning the fact that just when Ferdinand VII, 
restored after three years anarchy under the liberal regime, was 
beginning to reestablish order in his dominions, both in Europe 
and America, Britain had destroyed all his efforts by recognising 
the rebels. The note went on to accuse Britain of inconsistency, 
of denying Spain's legitimate claims, of placing unacceptable terms 
on mediation proposals, of acting against her own interests, and 
of violating her treaty obligations; and it concluded by requesting 
Britain to reconsider, as the Crown of Spain could never abandon 
its rights. An accompanyng prívate letter from Zea to Canning 
expressed the wish for good relations between the countries, and 
asked Canning to use his influence to have the decision reversed. 
Canning had no difficulty in defending Britain against the various 
accusations, annotating Zea's communication with counter argu­
ments; but at first he contented himself with acknowledging the 
prívate letter, and saying that the only point he found objectio­
nable was the allegation of treaty violation, which he strongly 
denied. 61
Meanwhile, the long awaited Spanish minister, Camilo Gu­
tiérrez de los Ríos, had at last arrived in London. In his fit1st! 
interview early in February, which involved Liverpool as well as 
61 P. R. O., FO 72/.299. Bosanquet to Canning, núms. 11, 14 (enclosing Zea's 
note of 21 January and translation), núms. 18, 20, dated 22, '¿7 January 1825 (most 
of núm. 11 and extracts of translation with Foreign Office annotations printed in 
Webster, Britain and Independence ... , II, págs. 431-437); P. R. O., FO 7i/307. Zea 
to Canning, 21 January; Canning to Zea, 8 February 1825. 
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Canning, the arguments in Zea's note were the main subject of 
discussion. But, while Los Ríos got the impression that the British 
ministers agreed that a grave injustice was being done to Spain, 
they were insistent that the decision could not be modified, far 
less reversed. Los Ríos thought this was partly because it had 
already been plublicised (he had earlier reported that the only cri­
ticism of the announcement at the opening of Parliament had been 
that the government had waited too long befare acting), but also 
because Canning, who was in office against the wishes of the 
King, had to court public opinion by furthering the nation's 
commercial interests. Thus the underlfying reasons were the extensi­
ve British capital investments in loans and mines, and the need to 
combat the commercial rivalry of the United States, which had 
already recognised Spanish America. In the face of such material 
interests, he felt there was little hope of Spain's arguments 
prevailing. 62
The allies also found Canning equally immovable, when 
early in March they added their protest to those of Spain, and 
lectured him on the principles of legitimacy. 63 This so annoyed 
Canning that in bis formal reply to Zea's note he cited instances 
where all the allies and Spain herself had acted against these prin­
ciples. This reply, which argued that the separation of the colonies 
from Spain was neither Britain's work nor her wish, but a fact 
to which she had to adjust her policy, Canning deliberately delayed 
until 25 March, explaining to Los Ríos that as Zea's arguments 
were based on an optimistic view of the situation in Peru, he 
wished to wait for definite news of the royalist defeat there. Los 
62 A.G.S., Estado, 8.187. Los Ríos to Zea, núms. 2, 3, 4. 9 February 1825. 
This defeatist attitude of Los Rios is consistent with the view of Mme. Lieven 
in a letter of 25 March 1825. She found him entertaining, but felt" that «the 
Good God did not put him into the world to represent Spain». The Private Letter.'J 
of Princess Lieven to Prince Metternich, 1820-1826. London, 1937, pág. 348. 
63 Temperley, Canning, págs. 151-153; Canning to Granville, 9 March 1825, 
and enclosures, printed in Webster, Britain and Independence ... , II, págs. 167-174. 
France appears to have tried to revive the idea of independent Bourbon monarchies 
in South America, but Canning felt such a suggestion would have to come from 
Madrid. Canning to Granville, 18 February 1825, printed in Official Correspon­
dence, I, págs. 245-259. 
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Ríos had, however, deduced that Canning (as he privately admit­
ted) was equally concerned with awaiting the response of the 
allies. Canning also told Zea, in a confidential letter of 30 April, 
that he had only included contentious points because of the inter­
vention of the allies, and went on to say how much better off 
Spain could have been if she had accepted British mediation the 
previous years, rather than heeded the impractical advice of thc 
continental powers, to adhere to legitimacy and hope to restare 
her authority. She could have been at peace with Mexico and 
Colombia, and enjoying special commercial advantages, instead of 
still at war, and in danger of losing her principal remaining pos­
session, Cuba. And he again offered mediation. 64 But he already 
considered the question of Spanish American independence as 
closed, 65 and any possibility of mediation with the independent 
states disappeared when Zea revealed to Lamb that the King re­
garded it as his religious duty not to alienate any part of thc 
Spanish dominions. 66 In fact no step was taken towards Spanish 
recognition until after the death of Ferdinand VII, and this would 
appear to vindicate the judgement of Canning and Liverpool that 
there was no point in waiting far Spanish action. As was pointed 
out in the Memorandum of 30 November 1824, if Spain took 
as long to recognise the independence of Spanish America as 
she had in the case of the Spanish Netherlands, Britain might 
have to wait far sixty years. 67
64 P. R. O., FO 72/309. Canning to Los Ríos, 25 March 1825 (part r,rinted 
in Webster, Britain and Independence, II, págs. 438-440; A.G.S., E.stado, 8.187. 
Los Ríos to Zea, núm. 54, 24 March 1825; Canning to Granville, 25 March 1825. 
printed in Official Correspondence, I. pág. 260; Canning to Zea, 30 April 1825, 
printed in Webster, Britain and Independence, II. págs. 440-442. 
65 P. R. O., FO 72/299. See instructions to Bosanquet, núms. 7, 9, 29 March 
1825; to Lamb, núm. 2, .2 May 1825, P. R. O., FO 72/300, part printed in Webster, 
Britain and Indepe-ndence ... , II, pág. 442. Canning showed anxiety, in these and 
other communications, to try to restare good relations with Spain as soon as. 
possible. He also showed consideration for Los Ríos by sending him unwelcomc 
news about Peru, so that he would no learn about it flrst from the press. 
W. Y. A., Canning MSS 132. Canning, to Los Ríos, 2 March 1825. 
66 See Lamb to Canning, núm. 5, 20 June 18i5, printed in Webster, Britain 
and lndependence ... , II, págs. 442-447. Lamb did not reach Spain until early June, 
his departure having been delayed, flrst until the arrival of Los Ríos, and then 
because of a long illness. 
67 Despatches ... of Wellington, II, pág. :357. 
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British recognition was not official until ratification of the 
commercial treaties. 68 The first to be completed was that with Co­
lombia on 7 November 1825, and two weeks later the Colomhian 
minister had an official audience with George IV - the first 
occasion on which a Spanish American minister was received at 
a European court. «Behold! the New World established ... ! », de­
clared Canning. 69 In contrast to the decision of December 1824 
to negotiate the commercial treaties, the actual conclusion of the 
first passed without protest and virtually without comment. Can­
nings's words on this occasion merely underlined the point that 
the real significance of recognition did not lie in the establishment 
of a proper legal framework for British commercial relations with 
Colombia (though that was not without importance). Trade had, 
after all, been going on f or years, and continued to go on with 
Mexico (although the Anglo-Mexican commercial treaty was con­
siderably delayed for a variety of reasons), and with Chile, Peru 
and Central America (which w.ere not involved in the first round 
of treaty-making at ali). What was important was the establish­
ment of the principle of independence, which put an end to un-
68 Temperley questions the validity of this precondition, and suggests that 
willingness to negotiate probably constitutes recognition (see his Cannino, pág. 504).
The Cabinet, however, in the case of Buenos Aires, did not wish to be committed 
to recognition without seeing the terms of the treaty, and the Lord Chancellor 
tried to give effect to this in his advice on drawing up the full powers. W. Y. A.,
Canning MSS 75. Eldon to Canning� 16 August 1824.
69 Canning to Granville, 21 Noveber 1825, printed in Stapleton, Canning,
págs.445-447. Canning was anxious to get the presentation of the Colombian minister 
over as soon as possible. Canning to Liverpool, 14 October 1825, printed in Official
Co"espondence,. I, pág. 302. The King behaved impeccably, although a yea·r earlier 
opponents of recognition had argued that ,he would never receive Spanish American 
diplomats (see Canning to Granville, 21 October 1825, printed in Official Correspon­
dence, I, pág. 309). Canning, who had been on much better terms with the King 
since about March 18�5. had placed the monarch in his debt, by doing him the­
�avour of send!ng his rival for the aff ections of his mistress to a diploma tic post 
m South Amer1ca. In return the King wit�drew his objections to receiving envoys 
from that continent. Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot. 31 July 1825, I. pág. 410. The 
treaty had been brought to England in June, and Colombia's ratification arrived 
in October. W. Y. A., Canning MSS 102. Canning to George IV, 29 June, 14 October 
1825._ Although the Buenos Aires treaty had been signed in January, and com­
�umcated to Parliament in May, it turned out lhat the Buenos Aires representative
di? not have the correct credentials. A.G.S.. Estado 8.187. Los Rios to Zta, 
mtm. 97, 18 May 1825.
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certainty about the future of Spanish America. Until Britain pro­
claimed her intention to recognise, there was alwa'ys the remote 
possibility that sorne change of circumstances in Europe or Ame­
rica might lead to further attempts at reconquest by or on behalf 
of Spain. With British recognition, the Spanish Americans, and 
no doubt also those who dealt with them, felt much more secure. 
lt is this perhaps n1ore than anything that explains Bolívar' s 
tribute on the occasion of Canning's death, that the British sta­
tesman was responsible for the triumph of his cause. 70
It was not until two years after the British decision to re­
cognise that Canning made his most famous statement on the 
subject. In December 1826, a pretender to the Portuguese throne, 
aided and abetted by Spain, invaded Portugal in an attemps to 
take over its government. Britain had long-standing treaty obliga­
tions to defend her Portuguese ally. When Canning announced 
to the House of Commons on 12 December that Britain was 
sending troops to Lisbon, it was universally welcomed. But two 
opposition members took the opportunity to ask why he had not 
acted similarly when France invaded Spain, and what he proposed 
to do about the continued occupation. Thus provoked, Canning 
admitted that this had been an affront to British pride; but he 
argued that it did not call for militar'y intervention, for without 
her empire, Spain was a harmless and valueless prize. «If France 
occupied Spain, was it necessary in orden to avoid the consequen­
ces of that occupation that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I 
looked another way. I sought materials of compensation in another 
hemisphere. Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had 
known her, I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be, 
Spain 'wiht the Indies'. I called the New World into existence to 
redress the balance of the Old». This brilliant peroration «electri­
fied» the House, though sorne of his colleagues took exception 
to his use of the first person singular, and an unsympathetic obser-
70 «La América no olvidará jamás que Mr. Canning hizo respetar sus dere­
chos. Yo mismo me siento reconocido particularmente por el triunfo que ha dado 
a 'la causa que he defendido». Bolívar, S.: Obras Completas. 3 vols. Habana, 1950, 
vol. II, pág. 702. 
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ver found his belligerent bombast <<abominable». 71 Beneath this
rhetoric about the balance of power, in which in fact Latin Amd­
rica never figured, either in Canning's day or subsequently, lies 
an important assertion of motive, which Canning repeated in a 
letter three weeks later, apparently in response to attempts by 
French ministers to dispute the causal connection between the 
occupation and the recognition: «The French occupation was 
not the sole reason, nor perhaps in sorne quarters the most po­
tential and reconciling reason for [ the decision on recognition], 
but it was emphatically mine». 72 
But this is not the whole story. lt can certainly be said that 
the successful conclusion to the French invasion in October 1823 
gave a strong impetus to the British recognition process, and also 
that the continued French occupation was the main consideration 
in the final case put to the Cabinet in December 1824. But ta: 
link these as direct cause and effect is to overlook both the ante­
cedents, and the unfolding of events in the interim. The process 
had started in June 1822 with commercial recognition by Canning's 
predecessor, who had made it clear to Spain that further action 
would necessarily follow in due course. There were mercantile 
interests involved, and public and parliamentary support. Canning 
himself had proposed recognition in November 1822, 73 befare the 
French invasion, which «certainly hastened, but did not produce 
that measure». 74 There·was only a passing reference to the French
occupation of Spain in the report of the discussion in July 1824, 
le�ding to the decision to recognise Buenos Aires; and even in 
71 Kaufmann, British Policy, pág. 220; Hinde, Canning, pág. 422: Bethell,
L.: George Canning and the independence o/ .Latin America. London, 1970, págs. 12-
13; Greville, Memoirs, I, págs. 85-86; Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot, 15 December
1826, II, pág. 64. 
72 Canning to Granville, 2 January 1827, printed in Official Correspondence, 
II, págs. 24,2-244. 
73 Waddell, Anglo-Spanish relations .... págs. 473-483. 
74 According to the recollection of his wife, see Temperley, H.: Joan 
Canning on her husband's policy and ideas. «English Historical Review>, vol. XLV,
1930, pág. 413. She added: «-- for the year before Mr C. had declared to Spain 
that such an event must soon take place;\), possibly with reference to the warning 
given in Canning to A'Court, 18 October 1822, printed in Webster, Britain and 
Independence ... , II, págs. 390-:193.
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Liverpool's Memorandum of 30 November, it was given less 
consideration than developments in Spanish America itself and 
the threat from the United States. The danger of American rivalry 
seems throughout to have been the main concern of the Prin1e 
Minister, who, of course, fully shared the responsibility far the 
measure. Only when the arguments in the memorandum seemed 
insufficiently effective was the French threat stressed. No doubt 
the anti-French drum was a good one to beat in post-Napoleonic 
Britain. And the possibility that this was essentially a tactical 
argument, deployed in the hope of swaying waverers in the Cabi­
net, rather then the principal motive, is supported by tbe feeling 
of sorne of its members that they had been duped. 75
There is no real reason to doubt that Britain desired recogni­
tion far its own sake, and that she would have preferred to follow 
rather thant to precede Spain in this action. In the parallel and 
contemporaneous case of Portuguese America, where the mother 
country showed sorne disposition to negotiate, Britain did in fact 
delay her recognition of Brazilian independence until the mother 
country had herself acknowledged it in 1825. Spain was given 
similar opportunities to come to terms, though Britain had every 
reason to be sceptical about her willingness to give serious consi­
deration to the offers made to her. For there was no real possibility 
of Anglo-Spanish agreement, with Spanish recognition out of the 
question in the face of Ferdinand VII's religious scruples. As 
Zea put it to Lamb, when he suggested that if Spain was the lasr 
to recognise, she would not reap any benefit, «if such were to be 
the result ... he would not swerve one step from the path of honor 
and conscience to aver it, in the confidence that if these losses 
and sufferings were imposed from on High, human endeavours 
were inadequate to avert them». 76
D. A. G. WADDELL
75 Journal of Mrs Arbuthnot. I, pág. J70; Aspinall, Correspondence of 
Arbuthnot, pág. 71. 
76 Lamb to Canning, núm. 5, 20 June 1825, printed in Webster, Britain and 
lndependence .. . , II, pág. 444.
462 Anuario de Estudios Am�ricanos 
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 
Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://estudiosamericanos.revistas.csic.es
